Hippocampus American Government: The Establishment Clause in Court

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Many historians believe that the establishment clause was made intentionally ambiguous to accommodate the Framers' differing opinions. Regardless of the intent, this ambiguity has prompted the various Supreme Courts to interpret the establishment clause in three different ways: broadly, narrowly, and literally.

Courts that have taken a broad interpretation of the establishment clause have ruled that the government cannot use tax money to provide direct aid to religious institutions. However, religious institutions are allowed to use government services such as police and fire services. The government also makes reasonable accommodations for religious practices, such as allowing children in public schools to be excused for religious holidays. Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren and his Court heard cases that defined much of what is understood about the establishment clause.

The Supreme Court has at times interpreted the establishment clause narrowly. In these instances, the Court has determined that the government is allowed to support religious institutions as long as it remains impartial and does not support one religion at the expense of another. This interpretation has been criticized because it is difficult to determine what degree of involvement is truly impartial.

Courts that have literally interpreted the establishment clause believe that the First Amendment only prohibits the establishment of an official religion. Under this interpretation, the government is allowed to participate in religious activities indiscriminately so long as it does not endorse one religion over another. The key discrepancy among the three interpretations is the meaning of the word "separate."

Although the Supreme Court has not applied a consistent interpretation to the establishment clause, a number of key cases have defined the extent of the separation of church and state required by law. In the early 1960s, the New York Board of Regents required students to recite a short, nondenominational prayer at the beginning of every school day. A group of concerned parents filed suit against the Board of Regents alleging that their First Amendment rights had been violated. In Engel v. Vitale (1962), the Court supported the parents because there were clear religious elements to the prayer that infringed on the children's First Amendment rights. In Lee v. Weisman (1992), the Court also prohibited voluntary prayer at graduation ceremonies.

In Abington School District v. Schempp (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that the state of Pennsylvania was violating the establishment clause by mandating student participation in Bible readings. The Court reaffirmed its controversial decision in Stone v. Graham (1980) when it ruled that the Kentucky government could not require the 10 Commandments to be posted in public school classrooms. In a related case, Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) prohibited teachers in Alabama from conducting religious prayer services and activities during the school day. Civil libertarians such as Madalyn Murray O'Hair and groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have promoted a strict interpretation of the establishment clause.

The Supreme Court has consistently prohibited mandated religious involvement in public schools; however, the Court has allowed latitude for voluntary religious groups. In Westside Community Schools v. Mergens (1990), the court allowed a Christian group to meet on school grounds ruling that membership was voluntary and that denying the group would be limiting equal access. Also, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001), the Court allowed a private Christian group to use school facilities after hours, claiming that restricting their usage would be a violation of their free speech and free assembly rights.

Other significant court cases have allowed some involvement between the government and religious groups. In the early 1940s, New Jersey began compensating the parents of parochial school children for transportation costs. Some New Jersey citizens objected, stating that the use of tax money to support religious institutions was not appropriate. In the case of Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township (1947), the Supreme Court supported the New Jersey law, ruling that the money supported individual students, not the religious institutions they attended.

Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has made several seemingly contradictory rulings about the establishment clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court established three criteria that must be met in order for the state to provide aid to religious institutions: the purpose of the aid must be secular, the aid must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and the aid must avoid "excessive entanglement" with religious groups. The "Lemon test" allows school districts, legislatures, and courts to more easily determine whether assistance to religious groups is protected under the establishment clause. Despite the criteria established in Lemon, the Supreme Court has been criticized for its inconsistencies. The Court allows prayer in Congress and the words "In God We Trust" on federal currency. Like much of the First Amendment, the establishment clause has been passionately debated. Despite some inconsistencies, the Court has established rules and criteria that allow citizens to more easily determine whether certain behaviors are allowed under the establishment clause.